Children often believe that how a group is reflects how individual group members should be. We provided a strong test of this descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency by examining whether children (Ages 4 to 9) maintained the correctness of group norms even when such norms differed in their prevalence (e.g., drinking juice out of bowls instead of cups; Study 1) or in their valence (e.g., giving people punches instead of flowers; Study 2). In Study 1, disapproval toward nonconformity varied as a function of the norm's prevalence and of participant age. In Study 2, both children and adults approved of conformity to positive norms and disapproved of conformity to negative norms (e.g., "If Glerks make babies cry, an individual Glerk should not"). Nevertheless, across studies, descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning played a role. In Study 1, participants evaluated nonconformity to common norms as worse than conformity to uncommon norms (even though both cases involved uncommon behavior), and they evaluated nonconformity to uncommon norms as worse than conformity to common norms (even though both cases involved common behavior). In Study 2, participants evaluated nonconformity to positive norms as worse than conformity to negative norms (even though both cases involved negative behavior), and they evaluated nonconformity to negative norms as worse than conformity to positive norms (even though both cases involved positive behavior). Together, these data highlight the limits (and scope) of descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning and suggest that when children (and adults) evaluate the appropriateness of someone's behavior, they consider not only the behavior, but also, the norms of the group.
Who is worse, a doctor who kills people or an army sniper who does the same thing? In the first case, the doctor is violating not only moral principles but also the norms of their group (doctors are licensed to heal), whereas in the second case, the sniper is violating moral principles but is also conforming to the norms of their group (snipers are licensed to kill). Questions of this sort were at the heart of the present research. More broadly, we questioned the extent to which information about how a group is influences beliefs about how group members should be (i.e., descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning)-even in the strong case in which descriptive group norms entail uncommon (vs. common) behavior, thereby differing in their prevalence (Study 1), and in the even stronger case in which they entail negative (vs. positive) behavior, thereby differing in their valence (Study 2). We take a developmental perspective to understand when, and to what degree, children maintain the correctness of descriptive group norms even in the presence of competing principles. For example, do children believe that individuals should conform to group norms that are uncommon (e.g., raising a foot to ask questions instead of a hand, if the group does) or negative (e.g., giving people punches instead of flowers, if the group does)?
Group norms play a critical role in how people perceive and engage with the social world, likely because of the group-based nature of human cultural evolution. That is, detecting norms is adaptive for one's self (increasing opportunities for collaborations with others), one's group (enhancing group functioning, coordination, and strength), and one's culture (transmitting practices and rituals from one generation to the next; Claidière & Whiten, 2012; Tomasello, 2016) . Indeed, even preverbal infants expect group members to act alike (Powell & Spelke, 2013) , and across a variety of domains, young preschoolers are remarkably efficient at recognizing, learning, following, reproducing, creating, teaching, and enforcing norms (see Cooley & Killen, 2015; Hardecker, Schmidt, Roden, & Tomasello, 2016; Haun & Tomasello, 2011; Kalish, 2012; Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013; Riggs & Kalish, 2016; Samland, Josephs, Waldmann, & Rakoczy, 2016; Schmidt, Butler, Heinz, & Tomasello, 2016; Schmidt & Rakoczy, in press; Vaish, Herrmann, Markmann, & Tomasello, 2016) . As one example, after 2-year-olds witness an unnecessary action paired with a goal (e.g., twiddling a stick before using it to open a box), they interpret the action as normative, faithfully copy the action in their own behavior, and protest against those who do not, even when they understand that the action is unnecessary for the intended goal (Kenward, 2012 ).
Children's beliefs about how individuals should or should not behave stem from a variety of sources. Some studies demonstrate that socialization matters, such that children use their prior experiences and familiarity with groups, including those based on nationality or gender, to evaluate which behaviors are or are not appropriate (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Blakemore, 2003; Levy, Taylor, & Gelman, 1995; Olson & Enright, 2018) . For example, by preschool, children have often been socialized to believe that it is less acceptable for boys to engage in cross-sex behaviors and more acceptable for girls to do so (i.e., it is less acceptable for boys to be "sissy boys" than it is for girls to be "tomboys"; Green, 1987; Maccoby, 1988; Martin, 1990 ). Other studies demonstrate that ingroup membership matters, such that children are primarily concerned with making sure that ingroup members follow norms in order to promote their own group (Nesdale & Lawson, 2011; Rutland, Hitti, Mulvey, Abrams, & Killen, 2015; Wilks & Nielsen, 2018) . For instance, for the sake of promoting their own group's functioning, children often disapprove of ingroup members who conform to unfair group norms (e.g., an individual from a selfish group who behaves selfishly) and often approve of ingroup members who do not conform to unfair norms (e.g., an individual from a selfish group who behaves selflessly; Cooley & Killen, 2015) . Similarly, for the sake of promoting their own group's reputation, children are more prosocial when in a group setting (Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2018 ). Other studies demonstrate that group dynamics matter, such that even though children believe that it is wrong for both ingroup and outgroup members to harm people (Killen, Rutland, Abrams, Mulvey, & Hitti, 2013) , they nonetheless believe that it is worse to harm ingroup members (intragroup harm) than it is to harm outgroup members (intergroup harm), because ingroup members are believed to be obligated to one another (Chalik & Rhodes, 2014; Rhodes & Chalik, 2013) . Taken together, previous studies revealed that children's reasoning about how individual group members should or should not behave is influenced by their experiences with the groups, ingroup biases, and concerns about group dynamics. Although these factors play an important role, recent research suggests that children's reasoning may additionally be rooted in a more basic intuition about groups.
Children's Descriptive-to-Prescriptive Tendency
Once children believe that a group is characterized by a behavior, they intuitively believe that individuals within that group should be characterized by that behavior, even when they are unfamiliar with the groups and therefore have no prior expectations about them, when they are not members of the groups and therefore are not invested in them, and when the group norms are innocuous . More specifically, when children (Ages 4 to 13) are introduced to novel groups that they are unfamiliar with, that they are not members of, and that are characterized by innocuous norms (e.g., "Hibbles" who listen to one kind of music and "Glerks" who listen to another kind of music), they negatively evaluate nonconforming individuals (e.g., it is negative for a "Hibble" to listen to music more typical of "Glerks"), and they justify their negativity through prescriptive reasoning (e.g., "Hibbles are not supposed to listen to that kind of music"; . This descriptive-toprescriptive tendency is elicited by minimal input (i.e., seeing groups engage in a common behavior, being introduced to groups through category labels or generic language; , and it emerges early in development across cultures (i.e., both mainland Chinese children and U.S. children treat descriptive norms as prescriptive; Roberts, Guo, Ho, & Gelman, 2018) . Indeed, children's descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning may have intuitive roots in a collection of domain-general processes, such as a psychological need for predictability (i.e., people want to be able to anticipate the events in the world; Dweck, 2017) , a general dislike toward pattern deviancy (i.e., violating repeated models or forms; Gollwitzer, Marshall, Wang, & Bargh, 2017) , or processes that help facilitate human cultural evolution .
The Role of Prevalence and Valence
The primary goal of the present research was to test the limits (and scope) of children's descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency. More specifically, we tested whether children maintained the correctness of descriptive group norms in the strong case in which the group norms were uncommon versus common (Study 1), thereby differing in their prevalence, and in the even stronger case in which the group norms were negative versus positive (Study 2), thereby differing in their valence. For example, should an individual conform to a group norm that is uncommon (e.g., raising their foot to ask questions if that is what the group does) or negative (e.g., punching people if that is what the group does)? These studies have important implications for understanding how early emerging cognitive biases contribute to social perception, how children reconcile group norms with competing principles, and how children evaluate individuals from diverse groups. That is, different groups are often characterized by different norms (e.g., some groups read from right to left, whereas others read from left to right, and across human history, many groups have treated cannibalism as permissible; see Diamond, 2000) . Does descriptive-toprescriptive reasoning influence how individuals engaged in such behaviors are perceived?
We introduced children and adults to groups that were characterized by norms that were distinct in their prevalence (i.e., common vs. uncommon; Study 1) and in their valence (i.e., positive vs. negative; Study 2), and then to a series of conforming or nonconforming individuals. We then measured participants' disapproval of the behaviors, negativity toward the behaviors, and open-ended explanations justifying their responses. Including these openended responses was important, as it permitted us to assess children's more unconstrained and spontaneous reasoning and allowed us to assess whether children showed different types of reasoning across the norm types. Because we were primarily interested in This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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how descriptive norms license prescriptive judgments, we presented participants with groups that were novel (e.g., Hibbles and Glerks), which prevented participants from reporting previously learned associations with familiar groups. Additionally, participants were not members of the groups, which prevented them from being guided by ingroup biases. Finally, the groups had no explicit relationship with one another and the group norms had no intergroup component, thereby preventing any concern about negative intergroup interactions (for research on how these factors matter, see Bigler & Liben, 2006; Killen et al., 2013; Nesdale & Lawson, 2011) . Across the two main studies, we focused on two child groups (Ages 4 -6 and 7-9) and one adult group (Ages 18 -40), as descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning declines across this age range . Data and sample materials are available in the online supplemental materials via the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/924cs/?view_onlyϭ10e70f99f4414 c90bd34d4643a066b42).
Item Validation
Concepts of prevalence (i.e., how common something is) and valence (i.e., how good something is) are interrelated (Bear & Knobe, 2017; Lindström, Jangard, Selbing, & Olsson, 2018; Phillips & Cushman, 2017) . For example, the average amount of time spent exercising each month is often interpreted as the ideal amount of time one should spend exercising each month. Given this conceptual overlap, we wanted to establish contrasting sets of group norms that were most clearly distinct in their prevalence (for use in Study 1) and another set of contrasting group norms that were most clearly distinct in their valence (for use in Study 2). To do this, we validated all items with a group of U.S. adults (N ϭ 208), who rated several behaviors in terms of their commonness and goodness.
1 As expected, participants rated all of the contrasting norms we used in both studies as different in their prevalence (how common they were) and valence (how positive they were). Importantly, the common/uncommon behaviors (used in Study 1) were rated as more distinct in their commonness compared with the positive/negative items (used in Study 2; see Table 1) , and the positive/negative items (used in Study 2) were rated as more distinct in their goodness compared with the common/uncommon behaviors (used in Study 1; see Table 2 ). The validation methodology, analyses, and data are presented in full in the OSM. 2 We next turn to our primary question regarding how these behaviors are perceived in a group-based context, in which individuals conform or do not conform to group norms that are distinct in their prevalence (Study 1) and valence (Study 2).
Study 1
If a group is characterized by an uncommon norm (e.g., drinking juice out of a bowl instead of a cup), should individual group members conform? This question provides a powerful test of children's descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency. On the one hand, because young children value conformity to what is familiar to them (Smetana, Jambon, & Ball, 2014; Turiel, 2014) , they may completely abandon their descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency (e.g., an individual should raise their hand to ask questions, even if their group members typically raise their feet), which would reveal the limits of descriptive group norms. On the other hand, children may completely maintain their descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency, even if doing so necessitates uncommon behavior (an individual should raise their foot to ask questions, if that is what their group does), which would reveal the scope of descriptive group norms. Thus, Study 1 tested two straightforward possibilities: (a) Children disapprove of uncommon behaviors (and approve of common behaviors) regardless of whether the behaviors entail conformity or nonconformity, and (b) Children disapprove of nonconformity (and approve of conformity) regardless of whether the behaviors are common or uncommon.
An additional possibility (not mutually exclusive from the other two) was that children would both maintain and lessen their descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency in a more nuanced way. For example, participants could generally disapprove of uncommon behaviors and could therefore disapprove of both nonconformity to common norms (e.g., a Hibble, who unlike other Hibbles, raises their foot to ask questions) and conformity to uncommon norms (e.g., a Glerk, who like other Glerks, raises their foot to ask questions). Nevertheless, participants could be more disapproving of the former than of the latter, given that the former additionally violates descriptive-to-prescriptive intuitions. Similarly, participants could generally approve of common behaviors and could therefore approve of both nonconformity to uncommon norms (e.g., a Hibble, who unlike other Hibbles, raises their hand to ask questions) and conformity to common norms (e.g., a Glerk, who like other Glerks, raises their hand to ask questions). However, participants could still be more disapproving of the former than of the latter given that the former additionally violates descriptiveto-prescriptive intuitions. We tested these possibilities in Study 1. We made no a priori expectations regarding any additional interaction with age group, though because acceptance of nonconformity generally increases with age Smetana et al., 2014) , we expected that negativity would decline with age.
Method
Participants. Three age groups of participants (N ϭ 151) were included: 48 4-to 6-year-olds (48% female, M age ϭ 5.25 years, SD ϭ .76), 48 7-to 9-year-olds (54% female, M age ϭ 7.77 years, SD ϭ .72), and 55 18-to 40-year-olds (47% female, M age ϭ 27.38, SD ϭ 5.46). Children were recruited in the Midwest at university-affiliated museums. Adults were recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk. The sample was 57% White/European American, 14% Asian American/Asian/Pacific Islander, 11% Multiracial, 7% Black/African American, 6% Latino/Hispanic, 1% Middle Eastern, and 3% other or not reported. Across both studies, we aimed to have at least 48 participants within each age group to fully counterbalance the design. Data collection was stopped the day this sample size was achieved. This research was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Michigan.
1 Participants also rated the behaviors in terms of their normalness and prescriptiveness, as these concepts may also overlap with concepts of commonness and goodness (Bear & Knobe, 2017) . These data are presented in the online supplemental materials.
2 Following our primary analyses, we also ensured that the detected patterns held at the individual item level. These data are presented in the online supplemental materials. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Materials and procedure. Materials were presented on Apple iPads using Qualtrics. There were eight novel groups (always presented in pairs), and each pair of groups was characterized by a contrasting norm: raising a hand or a foot to ask a question, eating cake or beans at birthday parties, using a leash to walk a dog or a cat, and drinking juice out of a cup or a bowl. We used eight distinct groups to prevent the same group from being common in their behaviors on one trial and uncommon in their behaviors on another. Each group consisted of three individuals located on one side of the screen (left or right), distinguished by clothing pattern (e.g., orange triangles, green stripes) and label (e.g., Hibbles, Glerks). Each group norm was depicted by an image (e.g., hand, cake slice) located above its corresponding group, to serve as a reminder (see , for a similar methodology).
First, participants were introduced to two novel groups; one was characterized by a common norm (e.g., drinking juice out of a cup) and the other was characterized by an uncommon norm (e.g., drinking juice out of a bowl). For instance, participants were told, "This group [pointing] is called Hibbles and this group [pointing] is called Glerks. Hibbles drink juice out of a cup [pointing] , and Glerks drink juice out of a bowl [pointing] ." Next, participants were shown two individual group members (in randomized sequential order), who either conformed or did not conform to their group's norm-for instance, "Look, this Glerk drinks juice out of a cup. Is it okay or not-okay for this Glerk to drink juice out of a cup?" This procedure was then repeated for the remaining three pairs of groups (the order of the four pairs of groups was randomized within participants). Thus, there were a total of eight trials in which participants saw two instances of each of four scenarios: (a) a common group norm that an individual conformed to, (b) a common group norm that an individual did not conform to, (c) an uncommon group norm that an individual conformed to, and (d) an uncommon group norm that an individual did not conform to (see Table 3 for examples). Both across and within participants, we counterbalanced whether a particular scenario was portrayed by a particular behavior (e.g., whether conforming to a common group norm was portrayed on the cups vs. bowls trial or another trial). Each behavior was depicted by a cartoon image located above the individual group member. Across participants, we counterbalanced which group had which norm as well as the left-right position of the groups. Lastly, as a comprehension check, all participants were asked, "What does it mean for something to be not-okay?" followed by "Does not-okay mean that someone should or should not do something?" (see also . Across both studies, all participants expressed prescriptive reasoning on at least In the U.S., how common is it for children to . . . Note. M1 ϭ mean ratings of common/positive behaviors; M2 ϭ mean ratings of uncommon/negative behaviors; M diff ϭ difference between M1 and M2.
Table 2 Item Validation Data of How Positive the Various Behaviors Were Believed to Be (Scores Could Range From 1 to 7)
In the U.S., how positive is it for children to . . . Note. M1 ϭ mean ratings of common/positive behaviors; M2 ϭ mean ratings of uncommon/negative behaviors; M diff ϭ difference between M1 and M2. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
one of these questions (e.g., "You did something wrong," "You're not supposed to do it," "Not-Okay means that you should not do it"). Measures and coding. The first measure (disapproval) was the frequency with which participants approved or disapproved of behaviors (e.g., "Is it okay or not-okay for this Glerk to drink juice out of a cup?"). We calculated the frequency with which participants provided "not-okay" responses for all four behaviors (potential range for each was 0 to 2, as there were two items per behavior type), which were the precise inverses of the "okay" rates. The second measure was the negativity with which participants disapproved of behaviors; participants who evaluated a given behavior as "not-okay" were shown a scale with increasingly unhappy faces and were asked, "Is it a little bad, pretty bad, or very, very bad?" (1 ϭ a little bad, 2 ϭ pretty bad, 3 ϭ very, very bad).
The third measure was the explanation a participant gave when they approved or disapproved of a given behavior (e.g., "Why is it okay/not-okay for this Glerk to drink juice out of a cup?").
We recorded the open-ended responses verbatim, and using previous research as a guide (Rhodes, 2014; Smetana et al., 2014) , coded responses into six types: (a) groupbased (e.g., "Hibbles do that," "That's what Glerks do"), (b) prescriptive (e.g., "They should do that," "You aren't supposed to do that"), (c) harm-based (e.g., "It will hurt them," "It might get teased"), (d) individual-based (e.g., "People can do what they want," "Everyone is different"), (e) similarity-based (e.g., "They are green," "They look the same"), and (f) other (e.g., "Because his foot is stinky"). Codes were not mutually exclusive, so participants could appeal to multiple explanations. Two coders who were blind to the hypotheses of the studies coded the responses (Cohen's kappa: Study 1 ϭ .81, Study 2 ϭ .78). Disagreements were resolved by discussion. We then calculated the percentage of times that each explanation type was given for each response type (e.g., approved conformity to a common norm), out of the total number of trials. The valence of the explanations often varied by whether participants disapproved or approved of the behaviors. For example, for prescriptive explanations, participants could use prescriptive language to disapprove of a behavior (e.g., they should not do that) or to approve of a behavior (e.g., they should do that). We used these broader codes because they captured the same framework (e.g., group membership, rules and obligations, consequences involving fairness or welfare, mental states, general appearances), thereby permitting a direct comparison across these explanatory frameworks (see Rhodes, 2014) .
Results
Across both studies, preliminary analyses revealed that there were no significant differences corresponding to any of the counterbalancing factors (e.g., which group conformed to which norm) or individual items, so data were collapsed across these variables. We report only the significant main effects, interactions, and pairwise comparisons that remained significant after a Bonferroni correction. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the disapproval data.
Disapproval. First, we conducted a 2 (norm: common, uncommon) ϫ 2 (behavior: conformity, nonconformity) ϫ 3 (age group: 4 -6, 7-9, adult) repeated measures ANOVA, with norm and behavior as within-subjects variables, age group as a betweensubjects variable, and disapproval rates as the dependent variable (scores could range from 0 to 2). There were main effects of behavior, F(1, 148) ϭ 83.68, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .36, and age group, F(2, 148) ϭ 8.45, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .10, and an interaction of behavior and norm, F(2, 148) ϭ 32.86, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .18, which were all qualified by an interaction of behavior, norm, and age group, F(2, 148) ϭ 7.23, p ϭ .001, p 2 ϭ .09. Across all studies, significant effects were probed by post hoc pairwise comparisons. With respect to common norms, all age groups were more disapproving of nonconformity than they were of conformity (4 -6: . With respect to uncommon norms, however, the youngest age group was equally disapproving of nonconformity and conformity, whereas the two oldest age groups were again more disapproving of nonconformity than of conformity (4 -6: [.26, .87] ). Indeed, 4-to 6-year-olds were more disapproving of conformity to uncommon norms than were the two older age groups (7-9: M diff ϭ .60, SE ϭ .12, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [.32, .89]; adults: M diff ϭ .68, SE ϭ .11, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [.41, .96]), and 4-to 6-year-olds were more disapproving of conformity to uncommon norms than they were of conformity to common norms (M diff ϭ .54, SE ϭ .09, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [.37, .71]).
Importantly, across all age groups, we found evidence for the persistence of a descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency. That is, nonconformity to common norms was disapproved of more often than Table 4 ). One important pattern that emerged from these data was that with respect to nonconformity to both common and uncommon norms, roughly half of children most This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
often approved and half of children most often disapproved (the majority of adults most often approved). We elaborate on this finding in the following Discussion section. Negativity. We next focused only on those participants who ever disapproved of nonconformity and were asked how negative the behavior was (n ϭ 68). We focused on negativity toward nonconformity because these were the only kinds of behaviors that all three age groups often disapproved of. A repeated measures ANOVA, with norm (2: common, uncommon) as the withinsubjects variable, age group (3: 4 -6, 7-9, adult) as the betweensubjects variable, and degree of negativity as the dependent variable (i.e., average rating on the 1-3 scale, across trials on which participants indicated "not-okay") yielded only a main effect of age group, F(2, 65) ϭ 27.76, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .46. Consistent with prior work , negativity toward nonconformity declined significantly at each age group: younger children (M ϭ 2.47, SE ϭ .13), older children (M ϭ 2.01, SE ϭ .13), adults (M ϭ 1.19, SE ϭ .12; all ps Յ .04, 95% CIs [.02, 1.71]).
Explanations. We next examined the explanations participants provided when asked why they approved or disapproved of a particular behavior. We did not examine explanations for disapproved conformity to common norms, as this response rarely occurred across the age groups. Also, not all participants provided explanations for each response type, so we did not compare across response types. Instead, we compared the frequency of the explanation types within each response type (e.g., frequency of various types of explanations for disapproved nonconformity to a common norm). That is, we conducted a series of repeated measures ANOVAs (one for each response type) in which explanation type was a within-subjects variable, age group was a between-subjects variable, and the percentage of given explanations was the dependent variable. Because the explanation data violated the assumption of sphericity, the Huynh-Feldt correction was used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the calculated F values (Field, 2011) . We focus next on the most common explanation types, although see Table 5 , and among participants who approved of nonconformity to uncommon norms, younger children gave mostly prescriptive explanations (e.g., "Because there is no rule against not raising your hand"), older children gave mostly individual-based explanations (e.g., "Different people can do whatever they want"), and adults gave mostly prescriptive and Note. Across studies, explanations could have been coded as of more than one type, and explanations that did not fit any code are not reported (percentages could therefore not equal 100). Data for disapproved conformity to common norms are not provided, as this response was rarely given. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
individual-based explanations (interaction of explanation type and age group, F(6.07, 297.18) ϭ 3.17, p ϭ .005, p 2 ϭ .06).
Discussion
Overall, both children and adults were more disapproving of nonconformity than of conformity, irrespective of whether nonconformity was to a common or an uncommon norm. Interestingly, this means that across age groups, participants disapproved of individuals who went against common group norms (e.g., an individual who raised their foot to ask questions, unlike their group members) but also disapproved of individuals who went against uncommon group norms (e.g., an individual who raised their hand to ask questions, unlike their group members). Moreover, two findings revealed that the descriptive norms influenced participants' judgments. First, all age groups were more disapproving of individuals who did not conform to common norms than of individuals who conformed to uncommon norms (e.g., someone who raised their foot to ask questions, unlike their group, was worse than someone who raised their foot to ask questions, like their group), suggesting that the act of nonconformity, which violated descriptive-to-prescriptive expectations, worsened the uncommon behavior. Second, all age groups were more disapproving of individuals who did not conform to uncommon norms than of individuals who conformed to common norms (e.g., someone who raised their hand to ask questions, unlike their group, was worse than someone who raised their hand to ask questions, like their group), demonstrating that participants disapproved of individuals who defied their group's norm even for the sake of doing what was most common.
Notably, although each participant group was more disapproving of nonconformity than of conformity, none disapproved of nonconformity at a particularly high rate (i.e., scores could range from 0 to 2 and average rates of disapproval never exceeded 1.20). Critically though, the nonparametric analyses revealed that participants were not simply at chance in their responding (randomly alternating between approval and disapproval). Rather, roughly half of the participants consistently approved of nonconformity, whereas the other half consistently disapproved (regarding conformity, participants generally approved, with the exception of the youngest age group regarding conformity to uncommon norms). Future research is needed to understand why some individuals approved while others disapproved, and such research could include individual difference measures. One possibility is that individuals with higher levels of theory of mind (e.g., thinking from another person's perspective) may be particularly likely to focus on individual perspectives and subsequently approve of nonconformity (see Smetana et al., 2012) . In any case, what is most important for the purposes of the present research is that all participant groups were more disapproving of nonconformity than [of] conformity.
There were also important developmental differences, such that young children (4 -6 years of age) were unique in most often disapproving of individuals who conformed to uncommon behaviors, unlike older children and adults. These data suggest that younger children are less accepting of individuals who go against common societal norms, compared with older children who understand that such norms are themselves group-defined (see also Smetana et al., 2014) . In other words, with age, consideration of a broad societal norm declined, whereas consideration of a particular group's specific norm persisted. Nevertheless, even this youngest age group more often disapproved of nonconformity to common norms than conformity to uncommon norms (both cases involved uncommon behavior), thereby highlighting further the role of descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning early in development.
The explanation data yielded useful insights. Across all age groups, participants justified their disapproval of nonconformity with group-based and prescriptive explanations, irrespective of the norm's prevalence. That is, even when individuals went against their group to behave in a way that was common in U.S. society, children and adults disapproved by appealing to group membership (e.g., "That is not what Hibbles do") and to norms (e.g., "Hibbles should not do that"). Similarly, when individuals went against their group to behave in a way that was uncommon in U.S. society, they disapproved by appealing to group membership and to norms. Thus, irrespective of what the behavior was, those who disapproved of nonconformity appealed to groups and to norms. Importantly, not all participants disapproved of nonconformity, and those who approved provided very different explanations. Older children and adults who approved of nonconformity often appealed to individuality (e.g., "Everyone can do whatever they want"), which is consistent with prior research (Rhodes, 2014; . In contrast, younger children were more likely to justify their approval of nonconformity (to common or uncommon norms) with prescriptive reasoning (e.g., "Because there are rules about not doing it"; "Because you are supposed to eat cake at birthday parties").
Study 2
If a group is characterized by a negative norm (e.g., making babies cry), should individual group members conform? This question provides an even stronger test of descriptive-toprescriptive reasoning than was tested in Study 1. On the one hand, children may abandon their descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency when the group norm is negative (e.g., an individual should make babies smile, even if their group typically makes babies cry), which would speak to the limits of this tendency. Indeed, children believe strongly that people should do what is morally appropriate and prosocial (Nucci, 2001; Smetana et al., 2014; Turiel, 2014; Warneken, 2015) . On the other hand, children may maintain their descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency, even if doing so necessitates negative behavior (e.g., an individual group member should make babies cry, if that is what their group does), which would reveal the scope of this tendency. Consistent with this possibility, research suggests that young children are more accepting of ingroup members who harm outgroup members than of ingroup members who harm ingroup members, suggesting that children account for group membership when considering the acceptability of negatively valenced behaviors (Rhodes, 2012) . Moreover, Kim, Chen, Smetana, and Greenberger (2016) found that children were more likely to approve of harming others when they learned that their peers were accepting of such behavior, suggesting further that group concepts can modulate the influence of moral principles (for similar research with adults, see Kundu & Cummins, 2013; Lisciandra, Postma-Nilsenová, & Colombo, 2013) . Thus, there were two straightforward yet competing possibilities: (a) Children disapprove of negative behaviors (and approve of positive behaviors) This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
irrespective of whether the behavior entails nonconformity or conformity, or (b) Children disapprove of nonconformity (and approve of conformity) irrespective of whether the behaviors entail positivity or negativity. An additional possibility (not mutually exclusive from the other two) was that children would maintain their descriptive-toprescriptive tendency yet apply it in a reduced, more nuanced manner. For instance, participants could generally disapprove of negative behaviors, and could therefore disapprove of both nonconformity to positive norms (e.g., a Hibble, who unlike other Hibbles, made babies cry) and conformity to negative norms (e.g., a Glerk, who like other Glerks made babies cry). However, participants could be more disapproving of the former than of the latter, given that only the former violates descriptive-toprescriptive intuitions (i.e., participants may believe that it is unacceptable to behave negatively, especially when one is from a group that typically behaves positively). Moreover, participants could generally approve of positive behaviors, and could therefore approve of nonconformity to negative norms (e.g., a Hibble, who unlike other Hibbles, made babies smile) and conformity to positive norms (e.g., a Glerk, who like other Glerks, made babies smile). Nevertheless, participants could be more disapproving of the former compared with the latter, given that the former violates descriptive-to-prescriptive intuitions. As in Study 1, we had no a priori expectations regarding any additional interaction with age group, other than that negativity would decline as age group increased.
Method
Participants. A new group of participants was recruited from the same sources as those in Study 1 (N ϭ 165): 59 4-to 6-year-olds (51% female, M age ϭ 5.19 years, SD ϭ .73), 51 7-to 9-year-olds (57% female, M age ϭ 7.82 years, SD ϭ .79), and 55 18-to 40-year-olds (44% female, M age ϭ 29.87, SD ϭ 5.80), including 71% White/European American, 10% Multiracial, 6% Asian American/Asian/Pacific Islander, 2% Latino/Hispanic, 2% Black/African American, 1% Middle Eastern, and 8% other or not reported.
Materials and procedure. The materials and procedure were identical to those used in Study 1, except that the novel groups were characterized by contrasting norms that were confirmed to differ in their valence (see the online supplemental materials): making babies smile or cry, playing with toys or breaking toys, giving people flowers or punches, and protecting ladybugs or stomping on ladybugs. Thus, there were altogether eight trials in which participants saw two instances of each of the following four behaviors: (a) a positive group norm that an individual conformed to, (b) a positive group norm that an individual did not conform to, (c) a negative norm that an individual conformed to, and (e) a negative norm that an individual did not conform to (see Table 3 ).
Results
Disapproval. We first conducted a 2 (norm: positive, negative) ϫ 2 (behavior: conformity, nonconformity) ϫ 3 (age group: 4 -6, 7-9, adult) repeated measures ANOVA with norm and behavior as within-subjects variables, age group as a betweensubjects variable, and the frequency of not-okay evaluations as the dependent variable (scores could range from 0 to 2). There was a main effect of norm, F(1, 162) ϭ 37.78, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .19, which was qualified by an interaction of norm and behavior, F(1, 162) ϭ 629.04, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .80. This interaction revealed that across all age groups, nonconformity to positive norms was disapproved more often than was conformity to positive norms (i.e., a Hibble, who unlike other Hibbles, made babies cry, was worse than a Hibble, who like other Hibbles, made babies smile; M diff ϭ 1.47, SE ϭ .06, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [1.34, 1.60]), and conformity to negative norms was disapproved more often than was nonconformity to negative norms (i.e., a Glerk, who like other Glerks, made babies cry, was worse than a Glerk, who unlike other Glerks, made babies smile; M diff ϭ 1.49, SE ϭ .07, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [1.37, 1.61]). Additionally, conformity to negative norms was disapproved more often than was conformity to positive norms (e.g., a Glerk who like other Glerks, made babies cry, was worse than a Hibble, who like other Hibbles, made babies smile; M diff ϭ 1.82, SE ϭ .04, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [1.74, 1.89]), and nonconformity to positive norms was disapproved more often than was nonconformity to negative norms (i.e., a Hibble, who unlike other Hibbles, made babies cry, was worse than a Glerk, who unlike other Glerks, made babies smile; M diff ϭ 1.14, SE ϭ .11, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [.93, 1.36]).
Importantly, however, the interaction further suggested an effect of descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning. That is, across all age groups, nonconformity to positive norms was disapproved of more often than conformity to negative norms, despite both of these cases involving individuals behaving negatively (i.e., a Hibble, who unlike other Hibbles, made babies cry, was worse than a Glerk, who like other Glerks, did the same thing; M diff ϭ .35, SE ϭ .06, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [.22, .47]), and nonconformity to negative norms was disapproved of more often than conformity to positive norms, despite both of these involving individuals engaged in positive behavior (i.e., a Glerk, who unlike other Glerks, made babies smile, was worse than a Hibble, who like other Hibbles, did the same thing; M diff ϭ .32, SE ϭ .06, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [.21, .43]). We also conducted nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-ranks test of individuals' response patterns in order to provide additional insight into these data (see Table 4 for the data and statistics). The majority of participants most often approved of conformity to positive norms and of nonconformity to negative norms, and the majority of participants most often disapproved of nonconformity to positive norms and of conformity to negative norms.
Negativity. Next, we focused on participants who expressed disapproval and were asked how negative the behavior was (n ϭ 133). We focused on instances in which individuals were engaged in negative behaviors (i.e., nonconformity to positive norms, conformity to negative norms), as these were the only kind of behaviors all three age groups consistently disapproved of. A repeated measures ANOVA with age group (3: 4 -6, 7-9, adult) as the between-subjects variable, negative behavior type (2: nonconformity to positive norms, conformity to negative norms) as the within-subjects variable, and negativity as the dependent variable (i.e., average across trials on which participants indicated "notokay"; scores could range from 1 to 3) yielded only a main effect of age group, F(2, 130) ϭ 16.03, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .20. Paralleling Study 1, negativity declined significantly at each age group: younger children (M ϭ 2.62, SE ϭ .07), older children (M ϭ 2.35, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
SE ϭ .07), adults (M ϭ 2.04, SE ϭ .07; all ps Յ .045, 95% CIs [.004, .82]). Explanations. The explanation data were analyzed as they were in Study 1. We focused only on participants who disapproved of nonconformity to positive norms or who disapproved of conformity to negative norms (i.e., two instances of negative behaviors), and on participants who approved of nonconformity to negative norms or approved of conformity to positive norms (i.e., two instances of positive behaviors), as these were the only consistent response types across the age groups. As in Study 1, we focus next on the most common explanation types, although see Table 6 for additional descriptive statistics.
Explanations about disapproved behavior. Participants who disapproved of nonconformity to positive norms (n ϭ 160) provided mostly prescriptive explanations (adults did so most often, interaction of explanation type and age group, F[6.04, 474.22] ϭ 5.66, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .07). Similarly, participants who disapproved of conformity to negative norms (n ϭ 133) provided mostly prescriptive explanations (adults, again, did so most often; interaction of explanation type and age group, F [5.02, 326 .20] ϭ 11.38, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .15). Explanations about approved behaviors. Participants who approved of conformity to positive norms (n ϭ 165) gave mostly prescriptive explanations (adults did so most often; interaction of explanation type and age group, F [5.32, 431 .01] ϭ 8.89, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .10), as did participants who approved of nonconformity to negative norms (n ϭ 142; adults did so most often; interaction of explanation type and age group, F [5.35, 371 .67] ϭ 3.09, p ϭ .008, p 2 ϭ .04).
Discussion
Children (and adults) disapproved of individuals who engaged in negative behaviors, regardless of whether those individuals conformed or did not conform to their groups, and nonconformity was judged to be worst when it entailed negative behavior. These data suggest that although children show a descriptive-toprescriptive tendency , they are much less likely to do so when those norms are negative (see also Cooley & Killen, 2015) . Also, in contrast to the varied explanation patterns detected in Study 1, participants in Study 2 consistently appealed to prescriptive explanations, irrespective of whether they approved of negative behavior or approved of positive behavior, and they did so to a greater degree than any other explanation type.
Nevertheless, several findings demonstrate that a descriptive-toprescriptive tendency influenced participant judgments. First, all age groups were more disapproving of individuals who did not conform to positive group norms than of individuals who conformed to negative group norms (e.g., someone who stomped on ladybugs, unlike their group, was worse than someone who stomped on ladybugs, like their group). That is, it was worse for an individual from a group with a positive norm to behave negatively than it was for an individual from a group with a negative norm to do so, suggesting that the act of nonconformity made the already negative behavior more negative. Second, all age groups were more disapproving of individuals who did not conform to negative norms than of individuals who conformed to positive norms (e.g., someone who protected ladybugs, unlike their group, was worse than someone who protected ladybugs, like their group), suggesting that the act of nonconformity made the positive behavior less positive. This finding was powerful, considering the alternative possibility that someone who is positive in defiance of their group could be viewed as especially positive because their goodness can be attributed to their own individual principles (Kelley & Michela, 1980) . Additional work should examine whether essentialism contributed to this effect. That is, children and adults often believe that social groups entail innate and inalterable "essences" that grant individuals their categorical identity (Gelman, 2003) . In the present study, participants could have conceptualized some novel groups as having a "negative" essence, subsequently inferring, for instance, that it was unnatural for individuals from "negative groups" to violate their group's essence. Indeed, to the extent that participants were guided by essentialism, counternormative behavior may have been perceived as unexpected and alarming.
General Discussion
If a group is characterized by a behavior, children often believe that individuals within that group should display that behavior . We tested whether children ad- Note. Data for disapproved conformity to positive norms, disapproved nonconformity to negative norms, approved conformity to negative norms, and approved nonconformity to positive norms are not provided, as these responses were rarely given. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
hered to this descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency in the strong case in which the group norms differed in their prevalence (i.e., common vs. uncommon; Study 1) and the even stronger case in which the group norms differed in their valence (i.e., positive vs. negative; Study 2). In Study 1, younger children approved of individuals who conformed to norms that were common to their own (U.S.) society and they disapproved of individuals who conformed to norms that were uncommon to their own (U.S.) society. Older children and adults, in contrast, approved of individuals who conformed to group norms, irrespective of the norm's prevalence (though all age groups generally disapproved of individuals who did not conform to group norms, irrespective of the norm's prevalence). These data align with those from previous research on developmental differences in beliefs about social norms: Young children expect individuals to conform to norms, be those norms common at the societal level or specific at the group level, whereas older children understand that social norms may be group-specific and subsequently accept individuals who violate common norms for the sake of group conformity (Smetana et al., 2014) . There were fewer developmental differences in Study 2, although the results also aligned with past work to show that both children and adults reasoned that individuals should engage in positive behavior (and should not engage in negative behavior), irrespective of the group's norm, demonstrating that even young preschoolers have remarkably adult-like beliefs about what is positive and what is negative (Killen et al., 2013; Smetana et al., 2014) . Critically, these data suggest that children do not blindly follow a descriptiveto-prescriptive tendency. Rather, their beliefs about what is most common or good can override how they expect group members should behave. Nevertheless, the present experiments revealed the powerful ways in which descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning influences the strength of participants' judgments. In Study 1, both children and adults evaluated nonconformity to common norms as worse than conformity to uncommon norms, even though both of these cases involved uncommon behavior, and they evaluated nonconformity to uncommon norms as worse than conformity to common norms, even though both of these cases involved common behavior. In other words, uncommon behavior was more acceptable if that was what the group was known for, and common behavior was less acceptable if that was not what the group was known for. Perhaps even more strikingly, in Study 2, both children and adults evaluated nonconformity to positive norms as worse than conformity to negative norms, even though both of these cases involved negative behavior, and they evaluated nonconformity to negative norms as worse than conformity to positive norms, even though both of these cases involved positive behavior. That is, it was more acceptable to act in negative ways if that was what the group was known for, and it was less acceptable to act in positive ways if that was not what the group was known for. Taken together, these data demonstrate the power of descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning: If a group is characterized by a behavior, be it common or uncommon, or positive or negative, both children and adults show a tendency to expect individual group members to conform to those norms, and they judge the behaviors of individuals in relation to those norms.
These data speak to how people reconcile group norms with competing principles. Generally, children and adults privilege conformity to whatever is most common or most positive, irrespective of what the group does, which highlights important limits on descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning. Nevertheless, these data additionally suggest that children and adults, to a nontrivial degree, maintain the correctness of group norms even when those norms are known to be uncommon or negative, which highlights the scope of descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning. This finding aligns with the broader literature on normative reasoning. That is, from an early age, children are quick to take a normative stance: They interpret the social world as being governed by rules and standards that must be followed (for a recent review, see Schmidt & Rakoczy, in press ). Such normativity is remarkably useful in that it promotes one's self, one's culture, and one's group (Claidière & Whiten, 2012; Tomasello, 2016) , though it can also result in beliefs and behaviors that seem "promiscuously" normative (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013) . For instance, children infer the existence of norms even when there is no language or instruction telling them to do so and even after having observed a behavior occur only once , they interpret unnecessary actions as normative and they reproduce and enforce those behaviors on their own (Kenward, 2012) , and they interpret novel and third-person group norms as if they were prescriptively correct ways that individual group members should be . The present experiments document that such normative reasoning remains influential even in the strong cases of uncommon (vs. common) and negative (vs. positive) behaviors. In doing so, we uncover how aspects of morality that are often considered independently (e.g., the harm/care and group loyalty/ betrayal foundations of morality specified by moral foundations theory; Graham et al., 2013) work in conjunction to influence social judgment, beginning early in development.
These studies also provide insight into how individuals from different groups with different group norms are evaluated. To return to the example with which we started this article, is a doctor who kills worse than an army sniper who does the same thing? Is a sniper who helps less positive than a doctor who does the same thing? Our data suggest that yes, children and adults believe that a doctor who kills would be considered worse than a sniper who does the same thing, and that a sniper who helps would not be considered as good as a doctor who does the same thing. Furthermore, our findings suggest that people may use ethnic or racial group membership to judge the appropriateness of behaviors. For instance, if children believe that Tanzanians eat with their hands, whereas Koreans eat with chopsticks, and then encounter a Tanzanian and a Korean who both eat with their hands, they may be negative toward the Korean not only because the behavior is uncommon, but also because they are violating the descriptive norms of their group. Similarly, if children believe that Black people are aggressive, whereas White people are pleasant, and then encounter a Black person and a White person who are both pleasant, they may nonetheless be more negative toward the Black person than toward the White person because they are violating the descriptive norms of their group (in addition to other race-based inferences; see Pauker, Ambady, & Apfelbaum, 2010) . In other words, when children (and adults) evaluate the appropriateness of an individual's behavior, they not only consider the behavior, but also, the norms of the group.
Consistent with this view, Hussar and Harris (2010) found that 8-to 12-year-old vegetarians viewed animal eating as unacceptable, but they were more tolerant of animal eaters who ate animals This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
than of vegetarians who did the same thing. Because animal eaters eat animals, it is acceptable for them to do so, but because vegetarians do not eat animals, it is less acceptable for them to do so. Hussar and Harris also found that concepts of commitment influenced children's judgments; vegetarian 8-to 12-year-olds condemned committed vegetarians who ate animals but not animal eaters who made no such commitment. In the present research, children may have conceptualized the novel groups, and their members, as having committed to their respective norms regardless of how common or negative those norms were, and they may have subsequently evaluated nonconformity as a violation of those commitments. Indeed, recent research suggests that children often believe that people are intentionally committed to their group (Noyes & Dunham, 2017) . Whether the same reasoning applied to group norms remains an open question for future research.
Another question left open by this research is the extent to which the various explanations were mutually exclusive. For instance, prescriptive explanations could have been motivated by other kinds of explanations (e.g., group-based or harm-based), as this could have been the case in both of the present studies. For example, "They should not do that" could mean "They should not do that because they are a Hibble" (i.e., prescriptive ϩ groupbased explanation) or "They should not do that because it is harmful" (i.e., prescriptive ϩ harm-based explanation). Similarly, group-based explanations (e.g., because Hibbles do that) could be either descriptive (e.g., because Hibbles [typically] do that) or prescriptive (e.g., because Hibbles [should] do that). Because we did not probe participant explanations beyond their initial response, our data do not distinguish between these two possibilities, and doing so would be an interesting question for future research. Nevertheless, recent research suggests that these sorts of generic explanations may indeed reflect prescriptive reasoning Prasada & Dillingham, 2006) . Group-based explanations may express aspirations or ideals more than descriptive accuracy (Wodak, Leslie, & Rhodes, 2015) . Similarly, they may appeal to principled features (e.g., those that are central features of a concept, such as cars having four wheels) rather than to statistical features (e.g., those that are associated with a concept, but less central, such as cars having radios), which license prescriptive inferences (e.g., cars are supposed to have four wheels but radios are not; Gelman, Cimpian, & Roberts, 2018; Haward, Wagner, Carey, & Prasada, 2018; Horne & Khemlani, 2018; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006) .
Additional research is also needed to directly test what underlying mechanism could account for why group norms shape the judgments examined here. One possibility is that group norms render the individual less negative (the entire group is doing it, so they are just following along), and another possibility is that the group norms render the behavior less negative (the entire group is doing it, so the behavior cannot be so bad). Of course, both possibilities could be operating. As stated previously, vegetarians often accept animal eaters who eat animals because they understand that different groups have different norms, and despite them understanding that not everyone eats animals (Hussar & Harris, 2010) . Also, both children and adults allow the opinions of their peers to influence what they construe as morally acceptable (Kim et al., 2016; Kundu & Cummins, 2013; Lindström et al., 2018; Lisciandra et al., 2013) . We look forward to future research that tests these possibilities in the context of descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning.
Future research should also test for individual differences, as doing so would help explain and contextualize the present data. In Study 1, for instance, 4-to 6-year-olds often disapproved of conformity to uncommon norms, although some approved. Those who disapproved could have attended more to the broad societal norm (e.g., it is not-okay to raise one's foot to ask questions because that is not how it is commonly done), whereas those who approved may have attended more to the specific group norm (e.g., it is okay to raise one's foot to ask questions because that's what Glerks do). Indeed, 4-to 6-year-olds who disapproved of conformity to uncommon norms provided mostly prescriptive explanations (e.g., [it is not-okay] because that is not how that should be done), whereas those who approved provided mostly group-based explanations (e.g., [it is okay] because they are a Glerk). Another question for future research is whether children from majority groups (e.g., White) are more likely to disapprove of nonconformity to common societal norms than children from minority groups (e.g., Asian, Black, Latino). Minorities, by virtue of their experiences, may better appreciate that some groups do not share the practices that are commonplace in society at large (e.g., eating with chopsticks rather than with forks; see Quintana, 2008) , and may therefore be more accepting of individuals who violate common norms. Unfortunately, because the sample in the present research consisted mostly of White children and adults-a serious shortcoming of this research, and psychological research more broadly (for critiques, see Dunham & Olson, 2016; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, & Legare, 2017; Rowley & Camacho, 2015) -we were unable to conduct subgroup comparisons. We look forward to future research with more diverse samples.
Importantly, the present research aligns with research in the tradition of social domain theory (SDT), which proposes that young children also prefer conformity to conventional norms (those that are flexible, arbitrary, and context-dependent, such as where to sit during snack time, what to wear in school, and which utensils to eat with), and to moral norms (those that are inflexible, nonarbitrary, and universal, such as helping and not harming, sharing and not stealing, protecting and not breaking), and that they perceive nonconformity to moral norms as more severe violations than nonconformity to conventional norms (Killen, 1990; Nucci, 2001; Smetana et al., 2014; Turiel, 2014) . Although norms that differ in their commonality could be conceptualized as conventional (e.g., it is common and conventional for Americans to eat with forks), and norms that differ in their valence could be conceptualized as moral (e.g., it is positive and moral to help others), we used more neutral language throughout the article, referring to norms that differed in their prevalence and valence rather than to norms that differed in their conventionality and morality. This more theoretically neutral language was selected based on some research proposing that conventional and moral norms are more difficult to distinguish than the SDT literature suggests (e.g., some conventional norms are inflexible and some moral norms area context-dependent; Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng, & Fessler, 2007; Lindström et al., 2018) and recommending that researchers distinguish between norms on the basis of the kinds of emotional reactions they elicit (see Haidt, 2008; Nichols, 2004) . The present research was not designed to address this debate, nor This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
was it designed to draw comparisons across the conventional and moral domains or to define them. Rather, our unique contribution is that even in novel and third-person contexts, descriptive information about groups influences how children (and adults) judge how individual group members should behave, even in the strong cases in which the norms vary in their prevalence and valence.
